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EXPANDING BACK-END RELEASE AUTHORITY IN
AMERICAN PRISONS
FRANK 0. BOWMAN, I1t
I. INTRODUCTION
T he title of this symposium-"Finality In Sentencing"-covers asmorgasbord of meaty topics. In this essay, I will nibble on
three. First, a concern with "finality" could be a delicate
euphemism for the view that the United States incarcerates too
many people for too long, and that mechanisms for making prison
sentences less "final" will allow the U.S. to make those sentences
shorter, thus reducing the prison population. Alternatively, one
might profess agnosticism about the overall size of the American
prison population, but nonetheless be of the view that at least
some appreciable fraction of inmates are serving more time than
can reasonably be justified on either moral or utilitarian grounds,
and therefore we ought to adopt mechanisms for identifying both
individuals and categories of prisoners whose terms should be
shortened. Finally, one might simply think it impossible, or at least
unwise, to try to make "final" decisions-at least good final
decisions-about how long someone should spend in prison at the
beginning of the prison term, particularly if that term is supposed
to be very long. Thus, one ought not make the initial, front-end,
judicial sentencing decision "final," but should instead create
mechanisms for one or more later second looks.
t Floyd R. Gibson Missouri Endowed Professor of Law, University of Missouri
School of Law. Many thanks to my excellent research assistant, Scott Sergent, for his
exhausting and exhaustive review of state parole release provisions. I am deeply grateful
for the input and suggestions, far better informed than my own, of Kevin Reitz, Franklin
Zimring, Richard Frase, and Marc Mauer.
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As it happens, I subscribe to a greater or lesser degree to all
of these notions. I explore them briefly below and conclude that
discretionary early-release mechanisms should be restored where
they have been abandoned, and reinvigorated where they have
languished. In particular, I suggest instituting a discretionary back-
end release mechanism for some long-sentence federal drug
prisoners and for long-sentence state prisoners more generally.
II. AMERICA'S OVER-INCARCERATION PROBLEM AND THE PLACE
OF SECOND-LOOK MECHANISMS IN SOLVING IT
One thing is indisputable: the United States imprisons
more of its people than any other country.' Our incarceration rate
is the highest in the world2 and is far higher than that of virtually
every other developed country.3 The U.S. incarceration rate is
more than triple that of Poland, the next highest member of the
thirty countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development ("OECD").4 Likewise, the absolute number of
people in American prisons and jails is immense, over 2.2 million
in 2011,' or about the same number held by China and the
Russian Federation combined.' The number of people not
actually in custody but under correctional supervision by virtue of
1. Entire World-Prison Population Rates per 100,000 of the national population, INT'L
CENTRE FOR PRISON STUDIES, http://www.prisonstudies.org/info/worldbrief/wpb-stats.p
hp?area=all&category=wb poprate (last visited Sept. 13, 2013).
2. The United States incarcerates in prisons and jails 716 persons per 100,000
population, just edging out the Seychelles for highest incarceration rate. Id. However, the
U.S. rate is notably greater than every other developed country of any size. For example,
the rate of the Russian Federation is 479 per 100,000; South Africa is 289 per 100,000;
Brazil is 274 per 100,000; Spain is 149 per 100,000; and the United Kingdom incarcerates
only 100 persons per 100,000 population. Id.
3. Id.
4. JOHN SCHMITT ET AL., THE HIGH BUDGETARY COST OF INCARCERATION 3 fig.1
(2010), available at http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/incarceration-2010-
06.pdf.
5. Entire World-Prison Population Totals, INT'L CENTRE FOR PRISON STUDIES, http://
www.prisonstudies.org/info/worldbrief/wpb stats.php?area=all&category=wb-poptotal
(last visited Sept. 13, 2013).
6. Id. The figure for China of 1,640,000 underrepresents the number of persons
held by the Chinese government because it counts only sentenced prisoners and excludes
those held in "detention centers." That said, even if one counts persons in detention
centers, the total of Chinese prisoners in all forms of detention only just equals the
number of American prisoners, even though China's population is four times the size of
that of the United States. China, INT'L CENTRE FOR PRISON STUDIES, http://www.prisonstu
dies.org/info/worldbrief/wpb-country.php?country=91 (last visited Sept. 13, 2013).
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being on probation, parole, house arrest, and the like is larger
still-nearly seven million.7 The massive size of the U.S. prison and
correctional population is a relatively recent development. From
the 1920s until around 1973, the U.S. imprisonment rate held
roughly constant8 but, in the latter year, both the incarceration
rate and the absolute number of prisoners began a sustained and
dramatic increase. 9 Over roughly the last forty years, the number
of sentenced felons in prisons, jails, halfway houses, or subject to
other forms of correctional jurisdiction increased more than
seven-fold, 0 while the U.S. population grew by less than fifty
percent."
The sheer size of the American prison population, its
explosive and unprecedented growth, and its stark
disproportionality to the practices of the rest of the developed
world at the very least raise the question of whether we incarcerate
too many people. To answer that question exhaustively would be a
task far exceeding the limited scope of this essay, but a survey of
the salient points related to our unusual penchant for
imprisonment suggests that American practice is difficult tojustify.
There are two fundamental yardsticks for measuring the
adequacy of punishment-desert and crime control. 2 As to the
first, the fact that the U.S. imprisons a higher percentage of its
population for longer terms than any other country could be
7. LAUREN E. GLAZE & ERIKA PARKS, BUREAU OF JUST. STATISTICS, CORRECTIONAL
POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2011 (Nov. 2012), available at http://www.bjs.gov/c
ontent/pub/pdf/cpusll.pdf (reporting 6.98 million persons incarcerated or under
correctional supervision in the United States in FY2011).
8. BUREAU OF JUST. STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS
ONLINE: STATE AND FEDERAL PRISONERS BY SEX (1925-2011) tbl.6.28.2011, http://www.we
bcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:LkYofklyBi8J:www.albany.edu/sourceboo
k/pdf/t6282011.pdf+&cd=2&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us/http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook
/pdf/t6282011.pdf (last visited Sept. 14, 2013) [hereinafter SOURCEBOOK].
9. Id.; Franklin E. Zimring, Penal Policy and Penal Legislation in Recent American
Experience, 58 STAN. L. REV. 323, 326-27 (2005) [hereinafter Zimring, Penal Policy].
10. From 1980 to 2011, the number of persons under correctional supervision in the
United States for all grades of crime increased from just under two million to just under
seven million. GLAZE & PARKS, supra note 7. From 1973 to 2011, the number of sentenced
felons under the jurisdiction of state or federal penal authorities increased from 204,211
to 1,537,415. SOURCEBOOK, supra note 8.
11. Between 1973 and 2011, the U.S. population increased from 211 million to 311
million, or about forty-seven percent. U.S. Population by Year, MULTIPL.COM, http://www.m
ultpl.com/united-states-population/table (last visited Sept. 13, 2013).
12. See generally Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility ofDesert, 91 Nw. U. L.
REV. 453 (1997).
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justified if America were home to more and worse thieves, thugs,
killers, and peddlers of sin than all those other countries-that is,
if it were objectively demonstrable that we harbor a far greater
proportion of more malevolent evildoers than anywhere else on
earth. 3 This is plainly not the case. For example, while the United
States reports a higher murder rate than any other large
developed country, its rank of roughly 104th in the world
nonetheless makes it a less homicide-prone locale than roughly
one hundred other nations. 14 Its reported rates of robbery, assault,
burglary, and theft, while relatively high, are lower than many
developed countries in Europe and elsewhere." The most that can
be said is that, for most types of crime, U.S. criminality falls
somewhere in the upper half of nations with similar political,
economic, and law enforcement structures. 16
13. Intentional homicide count and rate per 100,000 population (1995-2011), UNITED
NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis
/homicide.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2013).
14. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the U.S. homicide
rate in 2010 was 4.8 per 100,000 residents, a rate quadruple or more than that of Western
European countries like Great Britain, Ireland, France, Poland, and Germany. Id. On the
other hand, nearly fifty countries report homicide rates at least double that of the United
States. Id. Moreover, as dolorous as U.S. homicide numbers are, the U.S. homicide rate is
roughly eleventh best out of thirty-eight countries in the Americas. International Statistics
on Crime and Justice, EUROPEAN INST. FOR CRIME PREVENTION AND CONTROL 13 fig.4,
http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and analysis/Crimestatistics/International Statis
tics on Crime-and Justice.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2013).
15. In 2008 (the most recent year with the most complete data), the U.S. robbery
rate of 145.4 per 100,000 was among the top quartile in the world, but still lower than that
of the Russian Federation, England and Wales, Portugal, Spain, Belgium, and France.
Robbety at the national level, number of police-recorded offences, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON
DRUGS & CRIME, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/statistics/crime.ht
ml (last visited Oct. 4, 2013). In 2008, the U.S. assault rate was ranked sixty-fourth highest
in the world among countries reporting data, but lower than that of Israel, the Russian
Federation, Finland, Ireland, Sweden, England and Wales, Scotland, Portugal, Belgium,
France, and Germany. Id. And in 2008, the U.S. burglary rate of 730.8 per 100,000 was still
lower than Denmark, Iceland, Sweden, England and Wales, Austria, Belgium,
Netherlands, Switzerland, Australia, and New Zealand. Burglary breaking and entering at the
national level, number of police-recorded offences, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME,
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/statistics/crime.html (last visited
Oct. 4, 2013). In 2008, the United States experienced 2159 thefts per 100,000 population,
a rate lower than Denmark, Norway, Finland, Sweden, England & Wales, Scotland,
Germany, Netherlands, Australia, and New Zealand. Id.
16. "Contrary to common perception, overall rates of volume crime-such as
burglary, robbery and assault & threats-are not higher in the USA than in most parts of
Western Europe." JAN VAN DIJK ET AL., CRIMINAL VICTIMISATION IN INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE: KEY FINDINGS FROM THE 2004-2005 ICVS AND EU ICS 158 (2007). In any
event, transnational statistical comparisons of crime rates are notoriously difficult because
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Of course, questions of desert also have a normative
component. Different societies view identical conduct through
different moral lenses. It is neither surprising nor necessarily
improper if different nations impose different levels of
punishment for comparable behavior.'8  Accordingly, the
extraordinary rates of incarceration in the United States could be
explained and in large measure justified if American moral
sensibilities regarding crime and punishment were radically
different than those of the rest of the world-more censorious of
wrongdoing, more attentive to the injuries of victims, less sensitive
to claims of individual worth by defendants, and less receptive to
the possibility of rehabilitation.1 9 But it is not clear that Americans'
views of appropriate punishments, by which I mean the views of
the populace rather than the self-interested conduct of its elected
representatives, are radically different than those of the
inhabitants of other countries.2 0 The data in this area suggests four
important points. First, worldwide, there is a small, but positive
of differences in crime definition, the size and efficiency of law enforcement
organizations, the sophistication and thoroughness of crime reporting mechanisms, the
transparency of the data governments collect, and other factors. One particular result of
these considerations is that U.S. rankings for robbery, assault, burglary, and theft as
reported by UNODC almost certainly understate the relative safety of the United States
because the position of a good many countries listed as having lower rates can only be
attributed to faulty statistics. For example, in 2008, Egypt reported a total of only 747
robberies, or a rate of one robbery per 100,000 population. Given that this category
includes not only armed robberies, but any forceful taking of property from a person,
including purse-snatching, the reported statistic for Egypt is obviously a fanciful
understatement. Robbety at the national level, number of police-recorded offences, UNITED
NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-
analysis/statistics/crime.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2013).
17. VAN DIJK ET AL., supra note 16, at 19 (discussing survey results in which
Anglophone country respondents chose to punish the act of stealing a color television
differently than Nordic country respondents).
18. One might posit a supra-national standard of morality against which the criminal
systems of all nations could be measured, but as yet no such standard exists.
19. See, e.g., Michael Tonry, Rethinking Unthinkable Punishment Policies in America, 46
UCLA L. REv. 1751, 1767-69 (discussing Yale Law Professor Dan Kahan's theory that
punishment must be "'degrading,' 'stigmatizing,' 'shameful,' and 'intrinsically repulsive'
if it is to win public support" in America and similar Western countries).
20. VAN DIJK ET AL., supra note 16, at 147, 149 tbl.32 (showing that the change over
the years in the percentage of the American public who support imprisonment is similar
to that of other countries); see also Mike Hough & Julian V. Roberts, Sentencing Trends in
Britain: Public Knowledge and Public Opinion, 1 PUNISHMENT & SOC'Y 11 (1999) (finding
that while the British public expresses a general view that judges are too lenient and
sentences are too light, when presented with a particular case, respondents suggest a
sentence no greater than that customarily imposed).
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correlation between public attitudes about punishment in a
country and the punitiveness of the sanctions actually imposed by
that country." Second, although the American public is somewhat
more disposed toward prison as a sanction than inhabitants of
many developed countries, it is by no means the most punitive
among developed countries and, in any event, tends to favor
prison less than the people of underdeveloped countries.22 Third,
in the early 2000s, the American public became less disposed to
prison as a sanction and more lenient in its view of the length of
prison sentences when imposed.2 ' Fourth, and critically, the
divergence between public opinion and actual imprisonment rates
is far greater in the United States than in any other country; the
actual imprisonment rates in the United States far exceed the
levels public sentiment would predict. 24 In sum, the available
evidence does not seem to support the proposition that America's
markedly anomalous incarceration practices are fairly attributable
to a uniquely draconian set of American beliefs about crime and
punishment.
That said, one might explain America's turn to mass
incarceration beginning in the early 1970s on utilitarian crime-
control grounds, that is, as a rational response either to public
frustration with endemic lawlessness or to a sudden outbreak of
widespread criminality. However, even if the increasingly punitive
character of U.S. penal law was in some degree triggered by public
distress at an actual increase in crime, the nearly four-fold increase
in the population of the American correctional system since 1980
can only be justified if the prison explosion has reduced crime,
and done so in reasonable proportion to the human and fiscal
costs of locking up so very many people.25
It is undeniable that during the 1960s and 1970s, the
period immediately preceding the country's turn to a policy of
21. VAN DIJK ET AL., supra note 16, at 151.
22. Id. at 148 fig.31, 149 tbl.32.
23. Id. at 147, 149 tbl.32.
24. Id. at 150 fig.32, 151.
25. See e.g., FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE GREAT AMERICAN CRIME DECLINE 51-52
(2007) (using the concept of diminishing returns to explain the delayed but eventually
realized benefits of an increased prison population in the 1980s); Steven D. Levitt, The
Effect of Prison Population Size on Crime Rates: Evidence from Prison Overcrowding Litigation,
111 Q.J. ECON. 319, 348 (1996) (stating that "the marginal costs of incarceration are at or
below the accompanying social benefits of crime reduction" to support the argument that
higher incarceration rates reduces crime).
14 [Vol. 4:1
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mass incarceration, the United States experienced a dramatic
increase in crime rates, with the incidence of murder, robbery,
rape, and aggravated assault doubling or tripling. 26 Crime rates
bumped up and down at the newly elevated levels through the
1980s and into the early 1990s,27 but as Figures 1 and 2 illustrate
with respect to violent offenses, they then began a rapid and fairly
steady decline that persisted until the last year or so.2 8











26. See generally, Gary LaFree, Declining Violent Crime Rates in the 1990s: Predicting
Crime Booms and Busts, 25 ANN. REV. SOC. 145, 146-47 (1999) (noting that from the early
1960s to the mid-1970s the U. S. murder rate increased by 113.04% and the robbery rate
by 222.47%, while the rates for rape and aggravated assault "nearly tripled").
27. Id. at 147 fig.1.
28. The data in Figure 1 and 2 are derived from UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING
STATISTICS: DATABASE-DRIVEN, CUSTOMIZABLE ACCESS TO OFFICIAL UCR STATISTICS, http:/
/www.ucrdatatool.gov/Search/Crime/State/TrendsInOneVar.cfm (last visited Oct. 4,
2013); see also LaFree, supra note 26, at 147.
2014] 15
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Thus, one must acknowledge both that the national turn to
stringent policies of incarceration followed a period during which
crime undeniably increased and that, after the U.S. began
imprisoning an ever-increasing number of its inhabitants, the
crime rate in America dropped steadily for nearly twenty years.29
Indeed, few scholars of the subject deny that the increase in
incarceration rates and prison population has reduced crime.30
The point most in dispute is the magnitude of the imprisonment
effect in relation to other possible causal factors, such as
demographics (particularly the rise and fall in the number of
crime-prone youth),31 changes in the economy,3 2 changes in police
staffing and tactics,33 the rise and decline in crack cocaine
29. Of course, the crime drop lagged the onset of increasing prison rates by some
years. Incarceration rates began rising markedly in the mid-1970s, but crime rates did not
start their steep decline until the early 1990s. ZIMRING, supra note 25, at 46-52. Various
explanations have been offered to explain the discontinuity, but none seems entirely
satisfactory. Id. at 52-56.
30. See generally ZIMRING, supra note 25, at 48 ("Most criminologists ... would be
likely to credit incapacitation . . . as the mechanism that leads to imprisonment increases
reducing crime."); Levitt, supra note 25, at 321 (suggesting that despite some doubt
"[i]ncreased prison populations can reduce crime through either deterrence . . . or
incapacitation"); Ben Trachtenberg, Incarceration Policy Strikes Out: Exploding Prison
Population Compromises the U.S. Justice System, 95 A.B.A.J. 66, 66 (2009) (stating that "[f]ew
dispute the value of imprisonment in fighting crime").
31. ZIMRING, supra note 25, at 56-62; LaFree, supra note 26, at 153.
32. ZIMRING, supra note 25, at 63-69; LaFree, supra note 26, at 148.
33. ZIMRING, supra note 25, at 76-80.
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markets, 3 4 and abortion.3' Perhaps the most comprehensive review
of the literature reports that-depending on whether one
considers county-level, state-level, and national statistics and on
whether one takes account of simultaneity'-the data shows that a
10% increase in incarceration rate will produce anywhere from a
0.11% to a 22% reduction in crime rate, with the best studies
converging on a 2-4% decrease. 7 According to Franklin Zimring,
one of the leading authorities on the topic, estimates of the effect
of increased imprisonment on decreasing crime rates beginning
in the early 1990s vary from a low of 10% of the decline to a high
of 27% of the decline. 8 Whether a correlation on this order of
magnitude represents a success or failure of criminal justice policy
is in the eyes of the beholder. Certainly, a good many critics of
U.S. prison policy have been at pains to deny or at least minimize
the crime-control effects of mass incarceration.39 But one cannot
deny the obvious-if you lock up several million troublemakers,
often for achingly long periods, they will not be out in the
population making trouble, and, at least sometimes, they and
those who know of their fate will be deterred from committing
crime when out of prison. Crime should decline. And it has.
Nonetheless, one can believe that our recent infatuation
with imprisonment has reduced crime somewhat, even a good
deal, and still believe that we have gone overboard; that it is
unnecessary to imprison people at rates several multiples higher
than most of the developed world to control crime; and that the
34. Id. at 81-85; LaFree, supra note 26, at 153.
35. ZIMRING, supra note 25, at 85-95, 97-103.
36. Simultaneity is simply a fancy word for the fact that crime and incarceration
influence each other.
37. DON STEMEN, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, RECONSIDERING INCARCERATION: NEW
DIRECTIONS FOR REDUCING CRIME 3-5 (2007), available at http://www.vera.org/sites/defa
ult/files/resources/downloads/veraincarc vFW2.pdf.
38. ZIMRING, supra note 25, at 55.
39. See, e.g., Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Barriers to Reentry for the
Formerly Incarcerated: Hearing Before the H. Judiciary Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and
Homeland Sec., 111th Cong. 12-28 (2010) (testimony of Marc Mauer, Exec. Dir. of The
Sentencing Project), available at http://wwwjudiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/MauerlOO
609.pdf ("It is important to note that these dramatic increases [in the size of the U.S.
prison population] are largely a result of changes in policy, not crime rates."); Oliver
Yates Libaw, Incarceration Rate, Crime Drop Link Disputed, ABC NEWS (Sept. 28, 2000),
http://www.abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=95580&page=1 (quoting Marc Mauer, Director
of The Sentencing Project research group, as "challenging the idea that more prisons
necessarily mean less crime").
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costs of whatever crime reduction has been achieved are far too
great both in public funds spent and human years eaten by the
prison locust. This perspective is not only intuitively attractive, but
is consistent with the social science consensus that only a modest
fraction of the recent crime declines can be directly attributed to
increased prison rates.4 0 It draws particular support from at least
one study showing that the crime-control effect of increasing
incarceration is positive at relatively low overall rates of
incarceration, but that the crime-control effect diminishes as
incarceration rates increase until at high rates increasing
incarceration actually increases crime.4 1  Moreover, the
comparative experience of other western countries also supports
the notion that the United States has overused incarceration.4 2 Of
particular note is the recent history of Canada. Canada and the
United States experienced remarkably parallel increases and
decreases in crime between the late 1970s and the early 2000s.43
While Canada started from lower base rates of crime and
experienced both a smaller increase and a smaller subsequent
decrease, 44 the trends in the two countries moved somewhat in
lockstep.45 Yet the Canadian crime decrease of the 1990s
happened despite a decreasing rate of imprisonment.46 At the end
of the day, both moral intuition and the consensus of social
science data converge in supporting the conclusion that our
current levels of incarceration are unjustifiable, even if some
notable increase over the levels prevalent in the 1960s may have
been appropriate. 7
40. Raymond V. Liedka et al., The Crime-Control Effect of Incarceration: Does Scale
Matter, 5 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 245, 245-46 (2006).
41. Id. (contending that the crime-control effect of incarceration is positive at low
rates of incarceration, but becomes negative at high rates of incarceration); see also Geert
Dohnt, Evidence from Cocaine and Marijuana Minimum Mandatory Sentencing 1, 3-4 (John
Jay College of Criminal Justice, Working Paper No. 2012-03), available at http://www.jjay.c
uny.edu/departments/economics/Geert-03(1).pdf.
42. Michael Tonry, Why Are U.S. Incarceration Rates So High?, 45 CRIME &
DELINQUENCY 419, 419-22 (1999) (noting that although America's imprisonment rates
are "unprecedented" as compared to other Western democracies, high incarceration does
yield crime reduction in the United States).
43. ZIMRING, supra note 25, at 107-34.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 121 fig.5.17.
47. Levitt, supra note 25, at 348.
18 [Vol. 4:1
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Somewhat to the surprise even of those who have been
most attentive to America's long prison expansion, in the last few
years, the force of the arguments against mass incarceration seem
to have finally gained traction.48 The overall U.S. prison
population peaked in 2009 and has now declined modestly in
three consecutive years from a high of 1,615,487 inmates in 2009
to 1,571,013 in 2012.49 That said, the recent declines have been
driven primarily by events in California and Texas, which together
accounted for seventy-five percent of the 2012 decrease in prison
population.5 0  Moreover, although the population of state
prisoners has been inching downward since 2009, the federal
prison population continues to grow.51 Thus, even though the
long climb in U.S. prison numbers seems finally to have crested,
the American incarceration rate remains near its stratospheric
peak.
So if the big problem-the problem we really want to fix-
is simply that, despite modest retrenchment, we still have too
many people in prison, could we solve or at least ameliorate that
problem by adopting back-end release mechanisms in jurisdictions
that now lack them or by modifying such mechanisms in
jurisdictions that already have them? The simple answer is yes.
One could certainly reduce prison populations by changing prison
release structures.5 3 But the particulars of how that might be
achieved prove to be fairly complex and highly dependent on the
differing architectures of individual state and federal systems and
on the composition of existing prison populations. 54 To
understand these nuances, one must understand the different
48. JAMES F. AUSTIN ET AL., ENDING MASS INCARCERATION: CHARTING A NEWJUSTICE
REINVESTMENT 2-3 (2013), available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publicatio
ns/senCharting%20a%2ONew%20Justice%2OReinvestment.pdf (noting that an
"unusually favorable climate to challenge mass incarceration" provides a unique
opportunity for reform).
49. E. ANN CARSON & DANIELA GOLINELLI, BUREAU OF JUST. STATISTICS, PRISONERS
IN 2012 -ADVANCE COUNTS 1 (2013), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/
pl2ac.pdf.
50. The total U.S. prison population dropped by 27,770 inmates in 2012. Id.
California accounted for 15,035 of this number, while Texas accounted for 5852. Id. at 2.
For information on events in California, in particular the California Public Safety
Realignment, see id. at 4.
51. Id. at 2 tbl.1.
52. Id. at 6.
53. Zimring, Penal Policy, supra note 9, at 336-37.
54. Id. at 337.
2014] 19
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currents that, over thirty-five years, filled American prisons to
bursting.
From the early 1970s until about 1985, prison populations
rose steadily, apparently without an empirically provable relation
to changes in the statutory structures of criminal law
enforcement.55 Each year, more people were convicted of felonies
and incarcerated than in the year before,56 but this trend does not
seem to be statistically attributable to the sorts of formal changes
which came into play later, such as statutory expansions of
criminal liability, enhancements in statutory punishments,
restrictions on judicial exercises of sentencing lenity, or alterations
in back-end release mechanisms.57 Having been both a federal and
state prosecutor in this period, my recollection is that there was a
growing impatience, both in the public and among government
officials, with the persistence of comparatively high crime rates
and with the seeming ineffectuality of the rehabilitative model of
corrections that had dominated the first three-quarters of the
twentieth century.58  The upshot was that police arrested,
prosecutors charged, and courts convicted more felons each
year.5 9 At least in Colorado, where I was a deputy district attorney,
the legislature was beginning to experiment with now familiar
innovations like structuring judicial sentencing discretion,6 0
increasing presumptive sentences,6 1  and imposing mandatory
55. Id. 330-31.
56. Id. at 327 fig.1, 331.
57. Id. at 331.
58. Frank 0. Bowman, III, The Quality ofMercy Must Be Restrained, and Other Lessons in
Learning to Love the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 1996 Wis. L. REV. 679, 686-89 (1996).
59. Zimring, Penal Policy, supra note 9, at 327-28.
60. During my years as a deputy district attorney in Denver, Colorado, the state had
a three-tiered sentencing structure in which each crime of conviction was statutorily
associated with a presumptive middle range and a high and low departure range. The
sentencing judge was obliged to sentence the defendant in the middle range absent
findings of exceptional aggravating or mitigating factors that would justify a sentence
above or below the presumptive middle range. COLO. Rev. STAT. § 18-1.3-401(6) (2012).
This simple, sensible system was later found unconstitutional in the wake of Blakely v.
Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 313-14 (2004). However, the Colorado Supreme Court found
that if "properly applied, COLO. REV. STAT. 18-1.3-401(6) is constitutional," because under
the statute, an aggravated sentence may be based on "constitutionally authorized facts."
Lopez v. People, 113 P.3d 713, 719-28 (Colo. 2005).
61. In 1985, the Colorado legislature amended the criminal code to double the
length of presumptive sentences for all categories of crimes. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-
105(1) (a) (1986) (current version at COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-401 (2012)).
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sentence enhancements on repeat offenders6 2 and those who used
weapons.63 This increased the term of incarceration for many
prisoners and upped the overall prison population.64 Likewise,
frustration with parole authorities' exercise of back-end release
authority was rising, imposing some pressure on parole boards to
be stingier in their decisionmaking. 6 While the effect of these
shifting attitudes and incremental statutory changes may be
impossible to isolate statistically, they operated on a steadily
increasing entering cohort of felony defendants to push up prison
populations from the 1970s through the mid-1980s.
Professor Zimring identifies 1986-1993 as a second phase
of the prison expansion, this one driven by the so-called "war on
drugs."6 6 He contends that new drug statutes enacted at both the
federal and state levels calling for higher penalties for drug
crimes, combined with larger allocations of police and
prosecutorial resources to drug offenses, placed a far larger
number of inmates in prison for drug offenses than had previously
been the case, and that the resulting wave of drug offenders
perpetuated the ongoing rise in incarceration rates. 7 The Bureau
of Justice Statistics estimates that the percentage of state inmates
incarcerated for drug offenses increased from 8.6% in 1986 to
62. For example, COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-13-101 (1986) (repealed 2001), now COLO.
REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-801, mandated a life sentence to one convicted of a fourth felony. The
legislature also defined "life" as forty calendar years without the possibility of parole.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-801(1) (c) (2012).
63. For the current version of this provision, see COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-406(7)
(2012). For a similar Oregon law, see OR. REV. STAT. §161.610 (2011).
64. The cumulative effect of the increased sentences was to raise Colorado's
incarceration rate from 103 prisoners per 100,000 population in 1985 to 256 per 100,000
in 1992. RATE (PER 100,000 RESIDENT POPULATION) OF SENTENCED PRISONERS IN STATE
AND FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS ON DEC. 31, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS-
1993, at 601 tbl.6.30 (1994). In 1993, the Colorado legislature reduced the maximum
length of presumptive sentences for the four lowest categories of felonies by about twenty-
five percent. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-1-05(1) (a) (V) (1986) (current version at COLO. REV.
STAT. § 18-1.3-401(1) (V) (A) (2012)). In 1994, the legislature reduced habitual criminal
sentences. COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-13-101 (1994) (current version at COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-
1.3-801 (1) (V) (A) (2012)).
65. My impressions of the spirit of those times is reinforced by the recollections of
my brother, Herbert D. Bowman, who served as a Deputy District Attorney in San Diego,
California, in the 1990s. His experience of the California parole system was that the parole
board released scarcely anyone, even in some cases where the prosecution requested it.
66. Zimring, Penal Policy, supra note 9, at 331-32.
67. Id.
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22% in 1993.68 In the federal system, the fraction of prisoners
serving time for drug offenses leapt from 25% in 1980 to 60% in
1993.69 Moreover, the federal system was growing at an even faster
rate than state systems,o making the new federal emphasis on
drug prosecutions an even bigger factor in overall prison
population growth." It is important to emphasize that the mere
passage of more stringent drug statutes would not have led to
large increases in the population of inmates convicted of drug
crimes absent a concomitant commitment of police and
prosecutorial resources to investigate and charge these offenses. 2
Across the country, state and federal governments made that
commitment and the prisons filled with an ever-larger fraction of
drug defendants." All that being said, Professor Zimring's drug
war-based account provides only a partial explanation of prison
expansion from 1986 until the early 1990s.74 As I noted back in
1995: "If there had been no state drug prisoners in either 1986 or
1991, the state prison population would still have risen by 144,854,
or thirty-five percent during that five-year period."7 5
In the early 1990s, the percentage of state inmates held for
drug crimes stabilized and by the end of the decade began a
68. ALLENJ. BECK & DARREL K GILLIARD, BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS
IN 1994, at 1 (Aug. 1995), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/Pi94.pdf;
BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, SURVEY OF STATE PRISON INMATES, 1991, at 4 (Mar. 1993),
available at http://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/bjs/sospi9l.pdf.
69. BECK & GILLIARD, supra note 68, at 1.
70. Id. at 4.
71. The federal prison population has been increasing as a proportion of the overall
U.S. prison population for over thirty years. In 1980, federal prisons held 24,252
prisoners, or 7.7% of the national total. FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST.,
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS-1980, at 519 tbl.6.57 (2003), available at
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t657.pdf; FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, U.S. DEP'T
OF JUST., SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS-1985, at 531 tbl.6.29 (1986),
available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t629.pdf. By 1993, the federal prison
population tripled to 80,815, or 8.9% of the national total. BUREAU OF JUST. STATISTICS,
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE, tbl.6.28.2011 State and Federal
prisoners, by sex, 1925-2011, available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t6132011.
pdf. The proportion of federal prisoners in the national prison population crept steadily
upwards. For example, in 2000, federal prisons held 133,921 inmates, or 10.2% of the
national population. Id. Thereafter, the federal proportion grew again; in 2011, federal
prisons held 206,004 prisoners, or 13.8% of the national total. Id.
72. Zimring, Penal Policy, supra note 9, at 331-32.
73. Id. at 332.
74. Id. at 331-32.
75. Frank 0. Bowman, III, Playing "21" With Narcotics Enforcement: A Reply to Professor
Carrington, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 937, 972 (1995).
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decline that has continued."6 For example, between 2001 and
2008, the percentage of state prisoners held for drug offenses
dropped from 20% to 18.4%," and by 2011 fell further to 17%.
Nonetheless, the national prison population continued to rise. 79
Professor Zimring identifies the years after 1993 as a third phase of
the national prison expansion, one he sees as driven, not by drug
cases, but by generally applicable statutory changes in penal laws,
particularly at the state level.80 In a nutshell, he maintains that the
continued prison expansion from the mid-1990s forward resulted
from federal legislation providing encouragement and funding to
states for increasing their sentence lengths and prison capacity,
passage of state "three-strikes" laws and similar measures imposing
very lengthy, and often mandatory, minimum sentences on repeat
offenders, and-of particular importance to a discussion of back-
end release-the widespread adoption of "truth in sentencing"
statutes which mandated that defendants serve a greater portion
of the sentence imposed by the judge than had previously been
required. 1 One effect of these measures was to increase the
average time served by inmates.8 2 And, critically for the discussion
of back-end release, state prison populations have in the last
decade or so become increasingly dominated not by drug
76. Compare WILLIAMJ. SABOL, HEATHER C. WEST & PAIGE M. HARRISON, BUREAU OF
JUST. STATISTICS BULL., PRISONERS IN 2006, at 24 app. tbl.9 (Dec. 2007), available at
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p06.pdf, with WILLIAMJ. SABOL, HEATHER C. WEST
& MATTHEW COOPER, BUREAU OF JUST. STATISTICS BULL., PRISONERS IN 2008, at 6 tbl.7
(Dec. 2009), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p08.pdf, and HEATHER C.
WEST, WILLIAM J. SABOL & SARAH J. GREENMAN, BUREAU OF JUST. STATISTICS BULL.,
PRISONERS IN 2009, at 30 app. tbl.16c (Dec. 2010), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content
/pub/pdf/p09.pdf.
77. Compare PAIGE M. HARRISON & ALLEN J. BECK, BUREAU OF JUST. STATISTICS
BULL., PRISONERS IN 2001, at 13 tbl.18 (July 2002), available at http://www,bjs.gov/content
/pub/pdf/p01.pdf, with HEATHER C. WEST, WILLIAM J. SABOL & SARAH J. GREENMAN,
BUREAU OF JUST. STATISTICS BULL., PRISONERS IN 2009, at 32 app. tbl.17c (Dec. 2010),
available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p09.pdf.
78. E. ANN CARSON & WILLIAM J. SABOL, BUREAU OF JUST. STATISTICS BULL.,
PRISONERS IN 2011, at 9 (Dec. 2012), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/
pll.pdf.
79. Id. at 10 tbls.10 & 11.
80. Zimring, Penal Policy, supra note 9, at 333.
81. Id.
82. E.g., ALLENJ. BECK &J. MUMOLA, BUREAU OFJUST. STATISTICS BULL., PRISONERS
IN 1998, at 12 (Aug. 1999), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p98.pdf
(explaining that from 1990 to 1997, the average time served by state inmates increased
from twenty-two to twenty-seven months).
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criminals, but by those convicted of violent crime. 3 From 2000 to
2008, almost sixty percent of the increase in state prison
populations was in violent offenders. 4 By 2011, fifty-three percent
of all state prisoners were serving time for violent offenses.85
Added to Professor Zimring's state-level account are the
effects of two federal laws: the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984
("SRA")8 ' and the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986.87 The SRA
created the United States Sentencing Commission,88 which drafted
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines that went into effect in
November 1987.89 The guidelines system brought determinate
sentencing to the federal courts by reducing the discretion of
sentencing judges,90 abolishing parole, 9 1 requiring that prisoners
serve eighty-five percent of their stated sentences (in contrast to
the former system under which release commonly came after
roughly one-half of the stated sentence),92 and reducing the
fraction of convicted defendants eligible for probation.9 3 The Anti-
Drug Abuse Act created a schedule of stringent quantity-based
mandatory minimum sentences for narcotics offenses. 94 These
mandatory minimums not only created sentencing floors below
which judges could not drop,95 but influenced the structure of the
83. CARSON & SABOL, supra note 78, at 10.
84. WEST, SABOL & GREENMAN, supra note 76, at 10 tbl.7.
85. CARSON & SABOL, supra note 78, at 10.
86. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 3551 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
87. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C. § 801 (1986)).
88. Sentencing Reform Act §§ 991-998.




92. See NATHAN JAMES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42937, THE FEDERAL PRISON
POPULATION BUILDUP: OVERVIEW, POLICY CHANGES, ISSUES, AND OPTIONS 8 (2013),
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42937.pdf In 1986, two years prior to
implementation of the SRA, the proportion of the sentence imposed that federal
prisoners actually served was fifty-eight percent. WILLIAM J. SABOL & JOHN MCGREADY,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, TIME SERVED IN PRISON BY FEDERAL OFFENDERS 1986-87,
NCJ 171682 (1999), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/tspfo97.pdf
93. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. B, introductory cmt. 1.1 (1987)
(amended 2004).
94. Narcotics Penalties and Enforcement Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat.
3207 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 801 (1986)).
95. Judges can sentence below a mandatory minimum sentence in limited
circumstances, primarily in situations in which a defendant has cooperated with the
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federal sentencing guidelines in a way that produced higher
sentences even for drug defendants not directly subject to a
mandatory minimum.96 The combination of the Guidelines and
federal drug mandatory minimums pushed the number of federal
drug prisoners steadily upward beginning in 1987 and continuing
throughout the 1990s and 2000s, adding more than 80,000
additional inmates serving time for drug offenses. 9 7 However, the
Guidelines system also dramatically increased the number of non-
drug federal prisoners by over 70,000 through the same period.98
Increases in drug and non-drug inmates drove the total federal
prison population from under 50,000 in 1987 to nearly 219,000 in
2012.99 In sum, the federal system does not quite fit the Zimring
model of a 1986-1993 drug war prison increase followed by a
sentencing statute-driven prison increase. Rather, the federal
surge in both drug and non-drug prisoners was driven from the
outset by statutory changes designed to reduce judicial sentencing
discretion and to make federal sentences more severe.
In considering the causes and possible solutions for
America's prison explosion, there is a natural tendency to focus, as
we have done so far, on the events at the beginning of a prisoner's
term-arrest, decision to prosecute, conviction, the rules and
institutional interactions that produce a judicial declaration of a
number of months or years of servitude denominated as "the
sentence."100 But the teeming multitudes now behind prison gates
are also largely attributable to marked changes in the way state
government in the prosecution of others and the government moves for a sentence
reduction on that ground. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (2006); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 5, pt. K1.1 (1987) (amended 2004).
96. The quantity-based drug mandatory minimums affected the sentences even of
those not directly subject to them because the U.S. Sentencing Commission used the
mandatory minimum levels as benchmarks around which it structured its drug sentencing
guidelines grid. The result was higher guideline ranges across the board. SeeJAMES, supra
note 92, at 8.
97. See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, THE EXPANDING FEDERAL PRISON POPULATION 2
(Mar. 2011), available at http://www.asca.net/system/assets/attachments/2811/incFeder
alPrisonFactsheet March20112.pdf?1304452236 (showing an increase of sentenced
federal drug prisoners from 9,491 or 34% of the federal prison population in 1985 to
95,205 or 51% of the federal prison population in 2009).
98. Id. (showing that the number of federal non-drug prisoners rose from 18,132 in
1985 to 92,681 in 2009).
99. JAMES, supra note 92, at 3 fig.1.
100. See Alfred Blumstein & AllenJ. Beck, Population Growth in U.S. Prisons, 1980-1996,
26 CRIME &JUST. 17, 17 (1999).
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and federal governments determine when, and under what
conditions, a prisoner should be freed. These back-end decisions
are of two basic types: first, the release decision which determines
what proportion of the stated "sentence" a prisoner will actually
spend locked up;1 01 and second, parole revocation and
recommitment decisions which determine whether a prisoner who
has been conditionally released, but who has violated a condition
of his release, will be returned to custody. 102 This paper does not
consider the latter class of decisions, even though the evidence
suggests that it has contributed largely to the American prison
population explosion. 103
Consider release decisions. Not that long ago, prisoners
customarily served only about half or less of the sentence
announced by the judge on sentencing day.104 Virtually all
jurisdictions provided for near-automatic reductions in the
nominal sentence based on "good time" accrued for good
institutional behavior. 105 Also, all American jurisdictions had
"parole" or something like it-that is, a mechanism for some
administrative body to award further discretionary sentence
reductions, usually based on the judgment that an inmate had
become sufficiently rehabilitated to re-enter society. 106
101. Id. at 34-36.
102. Id. at 36-39.
103. From 1985 to 1997, the percentage of new prison admissions who were parole
violators increased from 23.4% to 34.5%. PAUL M. DITTON ET AL., BUREAU OF JUST.
STATISTICS, SPECIAL REPORT: TRUTH IN SENTENCING IN STATE PRISONS 4 (1999) available at
http://www.bjsdata.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/tssp.pdf In the 2000s, some one-
third of all prison admissions were for violation of parole. CARSON & SABOL, supra note 78,
at 5 tbl.3.
104. See SABOL & MCGREADY, supra note 92, at 1.
105. Id. at 7.
106. DAVID DRESSLER, PRACTICE AND THEORY OF PROBATION AND PAROLE 56 (1959)
(noting that in 1959 every state except Vermont had a statutory provision for both adult
and juvenile parole); The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of
Justice, Task Force Report: Corrections 65-66, in CHARLES L. NEWMAN, ED., SOURCEBOOK ON
PROBATION, PAROLE AND PARDONS 334 (Newman ed., 3d ed. 1968) ("In the adult field,
every state has an identifiable and separate parole authority, although in four states the
power of these authorities is limited to recommending a disposition to the governor.");
Vincent O'Leary and Kathleen J. Hanrahan, Parole Systems in the United States, in NATIONAL
PAROLE INSTITUTES AND PAROLE POLICY SEMINARS 13-15 (3d ed. 1976) (listing the adult
felony parole authorities for all fifty states and the federal government in 1976).
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But good time and parole fell out of favor. 107 Some felt
parole board decisions were arbitrary and potentially biased.10 s
Others thought that nobody was really capable of assessing
rehabilitation. 109 Some saw in parole nothing more than an excuse
to coddle criminals. 110 Others found it unseemly-somehow
dishonest-that a judge would solemnly sentence a defendant to
ten years, when everybody in the courtroom knew he would really
do five or even less."' Hence "truth in sentencing"-a
catchphrase for the idea that the time prisoners actually serve
should correspond closely to the sentence initially imposed-was
born.112 The truth-in-sentencing concept coincided with a national
move away from the judge-dominated, rehabilitation-oriented
indeterminate sentencing prevalent during the first three-quarters
of the twentieth century" and toward varying forms of structured,
determinate sentencing.11 In its most complete form, the
structured sentencing paradigm that emerged in the 1980s
imposes rules restricting front-end judicial sentencing discretion,
eliminates or severely constrains back-end parole release authority,
and writes into law a truth-in-sentencing requirement that virtually
all inmates would be obliged to serve a high percentage of the
judge-imposed sentence.1 15 Few jurisdictions adopted this model
in its entirety, but most adopted some of its components.116
Saliently, some forty-two states adopted truth-in-sentencing laws
requiring all those convicted of some or all felonies to serve a
specified minimum fraction (most commonly eighty-five percent)
of their sentences." 7 The cumulative effect of yearly accretions of
107. See Barbara S. Barrett, Sentencing Guidelines: Recommendations for Sentencing Reform,
57 Mo. L. REV. 1077, 1100 (1992).
108. Id. at 1079.
109. Id. at 1080.
110. Bowman, supra note 58, at 688.
111. Id.
112. See Barrett, supra note 107, at 1078.
113. Bowman, supra note 58, at 681.
114. Id.
115. WILLIAM SABOL ET AL., URBAN INST. JUST. POLICY. CTR., INFLUENCES OF TRUTH-
IN-SENTENCING REFORMS ON CHANGES IN STATES' SENTENCING PRACTICES AND PRISON
POPULATIONS 1, 47 (2002).
116. Id. at 1.
117. Id. at 3 (noting that the widespread adoption of truth-in-sentencing provisions is
often attributed to a 1994 federal statute which provided financial incentives to states that
adopted truth-in-sentencing laws, requiring all those convicted of specified violent
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new prisoners obliged to do so much of their time behind bars has
contributed to the engorgement of many state prison systems.118
For example, in Florida, all felony prisoners sentenced after Oct.
1, 1995, regardless of their offense of conviction, must serve 85%
of their sentences, and by 2012, 98.6% of Florida inmates had
been sentenced under the 85% law.119 Between 1990 and 2009, the
number of prisoners under the jurisdiction of the Florida
correctional system increased from 44,387 to 103,915.120
Structured sentencing reforms that erase or restrict parole-
release authority and mandate service of a high minimum
percentage of a prisoner's state sentence self-evidently result in
systems with less back-end flexibility. But they need not have
produced tremendous increases in prison population. If
legislatures had adjusted front-end sentences downward to match
the sentence lengths inmates were really serving before the new
laws, or given judges the latitude to do so, the effect on prison
populations would have been small. But often that did not
happen. Structured sentencing provisions were often only one
component of a wider program consciously designed to increase
criminal punishment.121 Legislatures either declined to adjust
front-end sentencing levels downward to account for the
lengthened terms mandated by truth-in-sentencing measures or
even raised front-end levels by increasing presumptive sentences,
adopting more mandatory minimum sentences and repeat
offender enhancements and the like.122 Even judges who retained
much of their old discretionary sentencing authority often seem to
have persisted in imposing more or less the same sentence lengths
felonies to serve at least eighty-five percent of their sentences.); but see id. at 7 (noting the
federal law "had relatively minor influence on state truth-in sentencing policies").
118. Id. at 12-13.
119. Doing Time: Most Florida Inmates Serving More than 85% of their Sentences, BUREAU
OF RESEARCH AND DATA ANALYSIS, FLA. DEP'T OF CORR., http://www.dc.state.fl.us/pub/
timeserv/doing/DoingTime20l3.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2013).
120. Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2012 Law Enforcement, Courts, and Prisons,
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 217 tbl.347, http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/ 2statab/law.
pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2013). Beginning in 2011, the Florida prison population decreased
for the first time in decades. Ashley Lopez, Florida's Prison Population Declines for First Time
in 28 Years, FL. CENTER FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING BLOG (Aug. 3, 2012),
http://www.fcir.org/2012/08/03/floridas-prison-population-declines-for-the-first-time-in-
28-years. As of August 2012, the population stood at 100,272. Quick Facts, FLA. DEP'T OF
CORR., http://www.dc.state.fl.us/oth/Quickfacts.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2013).




they always had, even though the real time served by defendants
might nearly double.'23 For example, if an old-law judge
pronounced a sentence of ten years, that customarily meant that
the defendant would serve perhaps four or five.124 Whereas, if a
judge in a truth-in-sentencing jurisdiction pronounced a ten-year
sentence, the defendant would serve more than eight.12' The most
extreme example of this phenomenon was the federal system,
which combined the complete elimination of parole, an eighty-five
percent truth-in-sentencing rule, and a restrictive guidelines
system in which sentencing ranges initially pegged to pre-
guidelines levels were nudged steadily upward year after year for
many offenses.'2 ' But less extreme variants of the same story
played out across the country. 27
Hence, in theory, one could now achieve an immediate
and quite dramatic decrease in prison populations simply by
repealing truth-in-sentencing laws and reinstating more liberal
good time provisions and discretionary back-end release
mechanisms like parole. The problem, of course, is that a
universal and explicit national rejection of truth in sentencing
with the expressed aim of dramatically cutting prison populations
seems somewhat unlikely.'2 A proposal that would, particularly if
made retroactive, cut the time served by virtually all felons by
perhaps half is a hard sell to elected officials.1 29 Such officials owe
their careers to voters. It is a striking fact that throughout the past
fifteen or more years of steadily declining crime, the American
public has persistently entertained the opinion that crime is
getting worse. 30 That said, a significant, if incremental and
123. Id. at 12.
124. See Paul J. Hofer & Courtney Semisch, Examining Changes in Federal Sentence
Severity: 1980-1998, 12 FED. SENT'G REP. 12, 13 (1999).
125. See id.
126. See Frank 0. Bowman, III, The Failure of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 105
COLUM. L. REV. 1315 (2005) (describing the one-way upward ratchet effect of the design
of the federal guidelines system).
127. SABOL ETAL., supra note 115, at 6.
128. See id. at 6-7.
129. Hofer & Semisch, supra note 124.
130. Lydia Saad, Most Americans Believe Crime In U.S. Is Worsening, GALLUP, http://www
.gallup.com/poll/150464/americans-believe-crime-worsening.aspx (last visited Oct 4,
2013). This is not an exclusively American phenomenon. For example, surveys of British
opinion showed strong majorities believing that crime was increasing when in fact the
reverse was true. Hough & Roberts, supra note 20, at 21.
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carefully targeted, reinvigoration of back-end discretionary release
mechanisms is quite possible. Skepticism about the utility of mass
incarceration as an anticrime measure has spread across the
political spectrum and is now shared by a number of
unimpeachably conservative voices." The gradual shift in opinion
among conservative elites combined with the fiscal imperatives of
an era of severe state budgetary constraint has already produced a
retrenchment in some states, and this movement may well have
room for still more back-end structural reform. 32
III. THE PARAMETERS OF A TARGETED REVIVAL OF BACK-END
RELEASE MECHANISMS
If back-end release programs should be revived, how
should the revival proceed? Should the revival be targeted at
particular types of crime? At particular classes of offenders? Would
it be most likely to succeed in the federal system or in those states
that have abandoned or severely curtailed back-end discretionary
release? The preferable shape of any revival of back-end release
mechanisms and the jurisdictions in which it would have the best
chance of successful adoption depend on what such a reform is
intended to achieve. If the only objective is to reduce sentences
regardless of all other considerations, then the only important
design questions would be narrow calculations of political
plausibility.133 If, however, the objective is not merely to reduce
prison populations, but to do so in a way broadly consistent with
foundational notions of desert and promotion of crime control,
one must consider not only what will fly in the current political
climate, but what will work to improve the criminal justice
system.134
131. For example, there is now an active conservative crime policy group called
"Right on Crime" endorsed by such Republican luminaries as Grover Norquist and Jeb
Bush that espouses reduction in incarceration rates. What Conservatives Are Saying, RIGHT
ON CRIME, http://www.rightoncrime.com/the-conservative-case-for-reform/what-conserv
atives-are-saying (last visited Sept. 5, 2013); see also What's Gone Wrong, RIGHT ON CRIME,
http://www.rightoncrime.com/the-criminal-justice-challenge/whats-gone-wrong (last
visited Sept. 5, 2013).
132. State Initiatives: Connecticut, RIGHT ON CRIME, http://www.rightoncrime.com/ref
orm-in-action/state-initiatives/connecticut (last visited Sept. 5, 2013); see also State
Initiatives: Vermont, RIGHT ON CRIME, http://www.rightoncrime.com/reform-in-action/sta
te-initiatives/vermont (last visited Sept. 5, 2013).




A. Revival of the Medical Model of Indeterminate
Sentencing Would Be An Error
In that vein, I am skeptical of any effort to revive the old
system, in which parole was but one part of a theoretically
integrated medical model in which both the judge deciding the
front-end sentence and the prison and parole officials awarding
good time and deciding on the parole release date were all
supposed to be working toward the same end-rehabilitation. 35 I
do not say that rehabilitation is impossible, or that it should not be
among the relevant considerations in front and back-end
sentencing decisions. But, the old system in which prison and
parole officials claimed the ability to make fine-grained
determinations of rehabilitative progress for virtually all prison
inmates rested on an insupportable intellectual conceit, made still
more difficult of realization by the resource constraints almost
inevitable in the operation of a politically supportable correctional
system.
B. Discretionary Parole Release for Short-Stay Prisoners
Seems Undesirable
Likewise, I see little utility in applying a parole release
mechanism to relatively short sentences-say five years or less. In
such cases, good time credits should certainly be available, both to
provide inmates incentives for self-control and self-improvement
and to afford the prison system an important tool for institutional
control.'36 But, highly individualized discretionary parole release
mechanisms seem unlikely to provide a benefit commensurate
with the political and fiscal cost of creating and operating them.'
In the first place, except for defendants who present such a
danger to the community that protracted incapacitation is in
order or defendants whose crime of conviction was so heinous that
retributive justice demands a lengthy term, short but definite
prison terms are widely accepted as most likely to achieve penal
objectives.13 8 In any event, a short prison sentence is already the
135. See Bowman, supra note 58, at 684 n.15.
136. Id. at 690 n.43.
137. Id. at 700-01 n.79, 714-15, 738, 738 n.214.
138. VALERIE WRIGHT, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, DETERRENCE IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
EVALUATING CERTAINTY VS. SEVERITY OF PUNISHMENT 8-9 (Nov. 2010), available at http://
www.sentencingproject.org/doc/deterrence%20briefing%20.pdf.
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product of a front-end determination by a judge based on all the
then-available data on the prisoner. If a subsequent discretionary
mitigation of the sentence is to be more than a thinly disguised
form of automatic good time credit, it must be the product of a
rational, individualized judgment based on new information about
the inmate arising from his behavior in, and response to, prison,
including the deprivation of freedom and whatever rehabilitative
programming he is afforded.1 39 For short-term prisoners, the
shortness of their stay and the sheer number of them present
immense barriers to collecting and evaluating enough information
to make meaningful individualized assessments of personal
rehabilitative progress. Personal growth takes time. Assessing it
takes even more. By the time most short-stay prisoners have been
inside long enough to experience whatever epiphany prison might
offer and to convince their keepers that the epiphany has
occurred, their sentences will be over or nearly so. Moreover,
generating meaningful, professional, and individualized
assessments of rehabilitative progress for every short-time inmate
would be a monumental task even with infinite resources; given
the fiscal realities of American penal systems, it is a fantasy.
Thus, if one's real objective is to secure a broad-based
reduction of sentences for defendants exposed to, or inmates now
serving, terms at the short-to-medium end of the current
spectrum, it may be more sensible to: (1) seek legislative action to
eliminate or reduce the incidence of mandatory minimum
sentences for some selected offenses; (2) urge adoption of more
liberal safety valves for low-seriousness offenders subject to
mandatory minimums;14 0 (3) seek more liberal good time
139. Amy L. SOLOMON ET AL., URBAN INSTITUTE, DOES PAROLE WORK? ANALYZING THE
IMPACT OF POSTPRISON SUPERVISION ON REARREST OUTCOMES 1, 1-2 (2005), available at
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/311156_DoesParole Work.pdf.
140. For example, since 1994, federal law has contained a so-called "safety valve"
permitting judges to sentence certain first-time drug defendants below an otherwise
applicable mandatory minimum sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) (2008). Senator Patrick
Leahy and Senator Rand Paul have introduced a more sweeping safety valve statute that
would effectively neuter the entire web of federal mandatory minimum sentences by
conferring on federal district judges the authority to sentence any defendant below an
otherwise applicable mandatory minimum sentence based on the extremely general
provisions contained in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See FAMILIES AGAINST MANDATORY
MINIMUMS, THE PAUL-LEAHY JUSTICE SAFETY VALVE ACT OF 2013" S. 619 (2013), available
at http://www.famm.org/Repository/Files/Justice%20Safety%20Valve%20Act%2OPrimer
%20S.%20619.pdf (describing provisions of the S. 619).
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provisions; and (4) urge that such measures be made retroactive if
passed.
C. Classes of Cases Suitable for Revived Back-End Release
Programs
Where parole or other true second-look mechanisms have
more appeal is in the case of inmates serving long sentences. Of
course, what should count as a "long sentence" for this purpose is
terribly difficult to determine. From an inmate's perspective, any
term exceeding a few weeks or months is likely to seem long.
However, the sort of back-end release program advocated here is
aimed at prisoners who have been inside long enough for the
system to gather meaningful information about background,
attitude, and behavior over an extended period. Long enough that
society's interest in retributive justice will have been in significant
measure served. And long enough for whatever maturation
process that a term in prison can bring to be observable. On
nothing better than intuition, I would define a long sentence as
one of at least five years, and perhaps rather more, perhaps on the
order of ten years. However one defines the category, it makes
sense to take a second look at long sentences, particularly for
certain classes of such cases.
i. Back-End Release in Federal Drug Cases
A great many people are serving very long terms for
narcotics crimes.14 1 As it happens, I spent a good part of my
professional life as a prosecutor helping convict such people and
put them away, and I think almost all of them deserved
punishment. But I also think two other things. First, because of
141. For example, in FY 2011, the mean sentence imposed on a federal crack cocaine
defendant was 104 months (8.6 years) and the median sentence was eighty-four months
(seven years). U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2011 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
STATISTICS fig.J (2012), available at http://www.isb.ussc.gov/content/pentahocdf/Render
XCDF?solution=Sourcebook&path=&template=mantle&action=figure xx.xcdf&table nu
m=Figure J (last visited Sept. 3, 2013). The median sentence for a federal
methamphetamine defendant was ninety-five months (7.9 years), while the mean sentence
was seventy-five months (6.25 years). Id. About forty-seven percent of all current federal
inmates were sentenced for drug offenses and more than forty percent of all federal
inmates are serving terms in excess of ten years. Quick Facts About the Bureau of Prisons,
FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, http://www.bop.gov/news/quickjsp (last updated July 27,
2013).
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several decades of legislative overreaction to a real but overstated
social problem, even traffickers who deserve punishment are often
imprisoned far longer than can be justified on grounds of
deterrence or just deserts.142 Second, the tide of public-and
political-opinion is shifting at least incrementally away from a
purely criminal justice approach to substance abuse generally and
away from draconian drug sentences. 143  The most obvious
evidence of the societal shift is, of course, the small but growing
number of states that have decriminalized1 44 or overtly legalized
the possession and use of marijuana, either for medical
purposeS145 or recreation. 146 But even in the case of other "hard"
drugs, notably including cocaine, sentiment favoring more
treatment and less prison is spreading, 147  and-quite
impressively-seems to span the otherwise unbridgeable partisan
divide of current politics. 148 For example, in August 2013, Attorney
General Eric Holder promulgated a new Justice Department
charging policy that discourages federal prosecutors from
including in indictments allegations of drug amounts that would
trigger mandatory minimum sentences for nonviolent, relatively
low level offenders.1 49 Remarkably, this memorandum did not lead
to a torrent of abuse from law-and-order conservatives, but instead
produced a low-key bipartisan hum of agreement and a number of
equally bipartisan legislative proposals for further moderation of
142. Bowman, supra note 75, at 973 n.147.
143. Id. at 970 n.132, 970-71, 985-86.
144. Sixteen states have decriminalized possession of personal use quantities of
marijuana, meaning that possession of such quantities is treated either as no offense at all
or as no worse than a minor traffic violation. States that have Decriminalized, NORML,
http://www.norml.org/aboutmarijuana/item/states-that-have-decriminalized (last visited
Sept. 3, 2013).
145. Twenty states and the District of Columbia have passed statutes authorizing the
medical use of marijuana. 20 Legal Medical Marijuana States, PROCON.ORG, tbl.1, http://w
ww.medicalmarijuana.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourcelD=000881 (last visited Oct.
4,2013).
146. Colorado and Washington have legalized the possession and use of marijuana
for recreational purposes. Legalization, NORML, http://www.norml.org/legal/legalization
(last visited Sept. 3, 2013).
147. See Bowman, supra note 58, at 684 n.19, 692 n.53.
148. Id. at 692 n.53.
149. Memorandum to the United States Attorneys and Assistant Attorney General for




drug sentences.150 A loose coalition of libertarian, fiscal, and
religious conservatives seems increasingly open to reduced
incarceration of drug defendants,' 51 and simultaneously seems to
be moderating reflexive opposition to expansion of discretionary
back-end release and reintegration efforts.152
A reinvention or reinvigoration of parole release
mechanisms directed at drug offenders generally, and particularly
those serving relatively long sentences, would serve two ends: (1)
mitigate the effects of a long period of drug policy overreaction on
those already sentenced who thus may not benefit from the
current impetus to moderate the sentences of those yet to be
sentenced,15 3 and (2) provide a mechanism for doing so that does
not require politicians to expressly repudiate their prior
sentencing directives. 154 Such measures allow cautious public
figures to say, in effect, "We're not surrendering in the war on
drug trafficking. We're not even lowering drug sentences
generally. Oh, no. We are simply providing for a sensible second
look at long sentences imposed on persons who may have been
rehabilitated and who are thus costing the taxpayers a lot of
money to no good end."
Back-end release mechanisms targeted at drug offenders
could certainly fit the policy objectives of states, but would be even
more suitable for the federal system. Violent criminals are a small
150. See, e.g., Attorney General Holder Expands Major Reform of Mandatory Minimum Drug
Laws, DRUG POLICY ALLIANCE, http://www.drugpolicy.org/news/2013/09/attorney-gener
al-holder-expands-major-reform-mandatory-minimum-drug-laws (last visited Oct. 29, 2013)
(describing three pieces of liberalizing legislation with bipartisan sponsorship: The Safety
Valve Act, co-sponsored by Sens. Patrick Leahy (D-VT) and Rand Paul (R-KY), the Smarter
Sentencing Act, co-sponsored by Sens. Richard Durbin (D-IL) and Mike Lee (R-UT), and
the Public Safety Enhancement Act, co-sponsored by Congressmen Jason Chaffetz (R-UT)
and Bobby Scott (D-VA)).
151. See Priority Issues: Substance Abuse, RIGHT ON CRIME.COM, http://www.rightoncri
me.com/priority-issues/substance-abuse (last visited Sept. 3, 2013). However, it should be
noted that this group limits its calls for lenity primarily to drug users, as opposed to drug
sellers. See also Theories of Punishment and Mandatory Minimum Sentences: Hearing Before the
U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION (May 27, 2010) (testimony of David
B. Muhlhausen Ph.D., Research Fellow for The Heritage Foundation), http://www.herita
ge.org/research/testimony/theories-of-punishment-and-mandatory-minimum-sentences
(questioning the utility of some mandatory minimum sentences and the advisability of
then-existing crack cocaine penalties).
152. See Priority Issues: Parole and Re-Entry, RIGHT ON CRIME.COM, http://www.righton
crime.com/priority-issues/parole-and-re-entry (last visited Sept. 3, 2013).
153. Bowman, supra note 75, at 973 n.149.
154. Id. at 972.
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fraction of federal inmates-only 7.2% are serving time for
conviction of a violent crime."' Even counting the 16.3%
sentenced for possessory weapons violations, explosives, or arson,
fewer than a quarter of federal prisoners are incarcerated for
actual or even potential violence.156 The majority of federal
prisoners are drug offenders (46.8%) and immigration violators
(11.8%).57 Due to the severity of federal drug laws and the
prevalence of tough mandatory minimums, it is among drug
defendants one finds the largest number of federal prisoners
doing really long terms. 15 s Not only does offering second looks to
federal drug offenders make a good deal of policy sense, but it
ought to be easier than making the same pitch for violent felons.
To be sure, federal sentencing policy has long been impervious to
rational argument and federal policy makers have been especially
prone to grandstanding in the narcotics field. 159 Still, the budget
cutting fervor now gripping the capital might provide cover for
changes that had until now seemed impossible.
Establishing a second-look mechanism for long-sentence
drug offenders in the federal system would be simplified because
the federal system has a long-dormant resource that could be
pressed into the service of such an initiative. The Federal Parole
Commission, which was supposed to wither away after the
enactment of the SRA, remains in existence, 160 wraithlike to be
sure, but an existing legal and administrative entity with long
experience, a long (if fading) institutional memory, and an
existing set of rules and procedures governing the process of
evaluating federal prisoners for release.161
Recent proposals for initiating or reviving back-end
discretionary release often place the decision in the hands of the
155. Quick Facts About the Bureau ofPrisons, FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, http://www.
bop.gov/news/quickjsp (last visited Oct. 4, 2013) (reporting that 4.1% of federal




158. FAMILIES AGAINST MANDATORY MINIMUMS, supra note 140, at 2.
159. Id.
160. Peter B. Hoffman, History of the Federal Parole System, U.S. PAROLE COMM'N 3,
http://wwwjustice.gov/uspc/history.htm (last visited Sept. 6, 2013).
161. U.S. PAROLE COMM'N, IFY 2013 PERFORMANCE BUDGET CONGRESSIONAL




judiciary," 2 but this allocation of responsibility seems unsound,
particularly in the federal case. There are no existing judicial
standards for determining eligibility for back-end release and
there is no obvious locus within the judiciary to develop such
standards. Some might suggest the U.S. Probation and Pre-Trial
Services System, but that organization is already overworked, not
expert in long-term correctional treatment, and situated in a
different branch of government than the Bureau of Prisons, which
holds the inmates and the bulk of the post-sentencing information
relevant to release decisions. Leaving the matter to the unguided
discretion of individual judges seems a very questionable
proceeding, pregnant with the possibility-nay certainty-of
flagrant disparities of treatment. Perhaps even more importantly,
federal judicial officers are already heavily overburdened and
there is no apparent disposition on the part of Congress to
increase their numbers. If a back-end discretionary release
mechanism were to be available to any more than a tiny fraction of
the more than 90,000 current federal drug inmates, the caseload
impact on judges would be substantial. It is simply implausible to
expect that judges could devote any more than cursory attention
to individual cases, which would mean in practice that virtually all
individual decisions would be either the products of individual
judicial caprice or a rubber-stamp ratification of a
recommendation by whatever official, whether a probation officer
or someone from the Bureau of Prisons, was ultimately charged
with evaluating prisoners for release.
Although no system is likely to be perfect, revitalizing the
existing machinery of the Parole Commission seems both efficient
and sensible. Given the concurrence of liberal and libertarian
sentiment against long mandatory drug sentences and the general
preoccupation with matters budgetary, it does not seem
implausible that Congress might charge the Parole Commission
with identifying a set of current and future federal prisoners
incarcerated for drug crimes who would, at some specified point
in their sentences, become eligible for consideration for early
release. Such a directive might, at least initially, focus on first-time
or nonviolent drug offenders subject to mandatory minimum
sentences or sentences greater than a specified length, perhaps
162. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 305.6 Tentative Draft No. 2, at 122-
23 (Mar. 25, 2011).
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ten years. Inmates in the statutorily specified class would not
necessarily be released, but would become eligible for
individualized consideration by the Parole Commission.
ii. A Second Look for Old Lags
The second class of cases we ought to consider for back-
end discretionary release is a little harder to define. Perhaps "old
dudes who have been in a long time." There are two good
justifications for taking a second look at cases like this. The first is
what I call the Morgan Freeman Imperative (you wondered how I
was going to get him in here). Those who have seen The Shawshank
Redemption will remember that Morgan Freeman is "Red," an old
convict serving life who is repeatedly denied parole, until, at last, it
is granted after he makes a memorable speech to the parole
board.' When asked if he is rehabilitated and regrets his crime,
he replies:
There's not a day goes by I don't feel regret. Not
because I'm in here, or because you think I should.
I look back on the way I was then: a young, stupid
kid who committed that terrible crime. I want to
talk to him. I want to try and talk some sense to him,
tell him the way things are. But I can't. That kid's
long gone and this old man is all that's left. I got to
live with that.16 4
The older I get, the truer this speech seems to me. Partly because I
am myself now closer to being an old man than a young one, I see
how much the years have changed me and those people I knew
when young. None of us are who we were. And that sense of the
mutability of human nature is heightened by the experience of
raising children, particularly young men. As you watch a son grow,
you are in a constant state of wonder at how much he changes
from year to year, and as he becomes a teenager and young adult,
in a constant state of fear that his maleness will drive him to do
some stupid thing that will blight his life before time has a chance
163. THE SHAWSHANK REDEMPTION (Columbia Pictures 1994).
164. Id. For quotes, visit The Shawshank Redemption, IMDB.COM, http://www.imdb.
com/title/tt0111161/quotes (last visited Sept. 23, 2013).
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to bring him better sense. Moreover, it turns out that the common
sense conviction that people tend to get wiser, or at least more
mellow and thus less dangerous, as they age is supported by crime
statistics.165 As the following figures show, crime is a young
person's game.166
Figure 3: Murder age-arrest curves













165. See CRAIG A. PERKINS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT: AGE
PATTERNS OF VICTIMS OF SERIOUS VIOLENT CRIME (1997), available at http://www.bjs.gov/
content/pub/pdf/apvsvc.pdf.
166. Figures 3 through 10 were recreated with data from the Bureau of Justice
Statistics. HOWARD N. SNYDER, BUREAU OF JUST. STATISTICS, PATTERNS & TRENDS, ARREST
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Figure 10: Burglary age-arrest curves
1000







In every crime category, the probability of committing the
crime peaks around the age of twenty and declines precipitously
thereafter until, by the age or forty or forty-five, even the
seemingly incorrigible bad guys have generally abandoned the
hood life.16' Yet, by 2011, fully thirty-nine percent of state and
federal prisoners were age forty or older, and more than one in
four was over forty-five.16' And the percentage of older prisoners is
growing far faster than prison populations generally. As Human
Rights Watch reported in 2010: "Between 1995 and 2010, the
number of state and federal prisoners age 55 or older nearly
quadrupled (increasing 282 percent), while the number of all
:116
prisoners grew by less than half (increasing 42 percent)."6
"There are now 124,400 prisoners age 55 or older."vo In short, to
the extent that imprisonment is justified on public safety grounds,
it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that the United States is
holding a large and growing number of persons who present a low
and progressively decreasing public safety risk.
167. Id.
168. CARSON c SABOL, supra note 78, at 7 tbl.7.
169. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, OLD BEHIND BARS: THE AGING PRISON POPULATION IN





Still, even after forty, not everyone quits. The lines on the
graphs in Figures 3-10 swing pretty low, but they do not drop to
zero until they get to people who, like Morgan Freeman's
character, really are old men."' So unless we want to afford a
release opportunity to only the truly geriatric, we will be making
judgments about a population some of whom are and will remain
a risk to reoffend. The question is how to separate the older-and-
wiser Morgan Freemans from those who are genuinely incorrigible
or at least present such a high risk of serious misconduct that they
should be held as long as the law permits.
This leads to the second justification for a second look at
long sentences. Front-end sentencing decisions in serious cases
customarily produce long sentences. In some such cases, the
length of a sentence is driven by purely retributive, just deserts
considerations. For example, those who commit premeditated
murder are thought to deserve very long sentences.7 2 Kantian
notions of desert require severe punishment as a moral matter.7 3
Society demands that it be imposed. And society may fairly judge
that the mere fact of the commission of the offense requires that
the defendant suffer the full measure of prescribed punishment,
regardless of whether he is likely to reoffend or reforms his
character and conduct while in prison. In such as case, the judge is
not asked to make a predictive judgment about whether the
defendant is likely to be rehabilitated either spiritually or
behaviorally.
But except with absolutely horrific crime, discretionary
front-end sentencing inevitably involves some predictive elements.
Is this defendant irredeemable, or might time moderate his
impulses and reform his behavior? If rehabilitation is at least
possible, what are the odds of achieving it? How long might it
take? What conditions of confinement would best promote it?
How should considerations of retributive justice be weighed with
predictive crime control considerations to set sentence length?
171. Id.
172. See e.g., Thom Brooks, Hegel and the Unified Theory of Punishment, in HEGEL'S
PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 103-23 (Thom Brooks ed., 2012); IMMANUEL KANT, THE
METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OFJUSTICE: PART I OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (John Ladd
trans., 2d ed. 1999). For an overview of the role of Hegel and Kant in theories of
retributive justice, see Edmund L. Pincoffs, The Classical Debate, in THE RATIONALE OF
LEGAL PUNISHMENT 9-17 (1966).
173. See KANT, supra note 172, at 137-44.
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Even if we want judges to consider these sorts of things, I
question how useful the exercise is when undertaken exclusively at
the beginning of a long sentence. The hard truth is that even the
best, most attentive, sensitive judges are going to be lousy
predictors of what someone, anyone, will be like ten, fifteen, or
twenty years from now. The charts above describe a general trend.
But it is not given to human beings to divine the future of
particular persons with any certainty. The proponents of so-called
evidence-based sentencing may plausibly claim to be able to use
social science data to make better predictions about the future
conduct of persons sharing certain characteristics than would be
possible without the data.174 But not even they have the hubris to
guarantee the course of particular human lives decades hence.
Nonetheless, it is reasonable to think that we can make a better
judgment about how a decade or more of incarceration will shape
an inmate's character if that judgment is made after all or most of
the decade has passed. Hence, a second, backward, look is likely to
be better at assessing how much time an inmate should serve than
a single, front-end, completely predictive look.
Even if one believes that a second look would be a good
thing, there remains the very tough question of whether
reinstating parole where it has been abandoned or reinvigorating
it where it remains would be politically doable. You may want to
free Morgan Freeman. But you may also, and quite fairly, fear
unleashing Willie Horton. For those too young to remember,
during the 1988 presidential campaign, Democrat Michael
Dukakis was derailed in part due to an infamous set of ads
featuring convicted murderer Willie Horton, who had been
released on a weekend prison furlough program supported by
then-Massachusetts governor Dukakis and who subsequently
committed a brutal rape and other crimes.17 Of course, that was a
furlough program, 6 not parole, but the point is the same.
Any second-look, parole-type program lives in the shadow
of two lessons of the Willie Horton incident. First, not every old
174. See, e.g., Richard E. Redding, Evidence-Based Sentencing: The Science of Sentencing
Policy and Practice, 1 CHAP.J. CRIM.JUST. 1, 2-3 (2009).
175. See George Bush and Willie Horton, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1988, http://www.nytimes
.com/1988/11/04/opinion/george-bush-and-willie-horton.html; Top Ten Campaign Ads:
Willie Horton, TIME, Sept. 22, 2008, http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/article
/0,28804,1842516_1842514_1842557,00.html.
176. See N.Y. TIMES, supra note 175.
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con is Morgan Freeman. The prisons hold a good many
unregenerate reprobates, and if you release any of them before
their maximum sentence, some of them will reoffend and injure
the innocent. Second, politicians will be irresistibly tempted to
make hay of those incidents when they inevitably occur.
Hence, at least as a political matter, a supporter of
reintroducing or reinvigorating parole would want to design the
revivified system in a way that minimizes the Willie Horton risk.77
This perhaps cynical consideration suggests that, in theory, it
might be easier to create a second look system that affected large
numbers of prisoners in the federal system than in many state
systems.7 8 Why? Simply because of the differing character of the
long-sentence inmate populations in state and federal prisons.
177. Michael Kinsley, Willie Horton's Revenge, BLOOMBERG (Jun. 17, 2012),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-06-17/willie-horton-s-revenge.html.
178. Ronald F. Wright, Federal or State? Sorting as a Sentencing Choice, CRIM. JUST.,
Summer 2006, at 16.
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Table 1: Composition of State and Federal Prison Populations by
Crime of Convictionl?9
State Prison Populations - 2010
* 53% of state prisoners
sentenced for violent
crime




- 12% for sex
assault, including
rape
- 10.8% for assault
* 17% of prisoners
sentenced for drug
crime
* 18% of prisoners
sentenced for property
crime
* 10.5% of prisoners
sentenced for public
order crimes like drunk
driving, violations of
court order
Federal Prison Population -
2010
* 7.5% of federal
prisoners sentenced for
violent crime
- 1.5% for murder
or manslaughter
- 4% for robbery
- 2% other violent
crime
* 48% of prisoners
sentenced for drug
crime
* 11.2% of prisoners
sentenced for
immigration offenses
* 15% of prisoners
sentenced for weapons
violations
* 5.4% of prisoners
sentenced for property
crime
As Table 1 illustrates, despite the common wisdom that
state prisons are jammed to overflowing with nonviolent drug
offenders and petty thieves, the majority of state prison inmates
are serving time for violent crime.so In recent years, it has been
increases in the presence of violent offenders that have driven
state prison populations upward.18 1 Moreover, in state systems, it is
179. The data in Table 1 is drawn from tbls.10 & 11 of the Bureau ofJustice Statistics'
report, PRISONERS IN 2011. See E. ANN CARSON & WILLIAM J. SABOL, BUREAU OF JUST.
STAT., PRISONERS IN 2011, at 10 (2012), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf
/p11.pdf.
180. See HEATHER C. WEST & WILLIAMJ. SABOL, BUREAU OFJUST. STAT., PRISONERS IN
2009, at 7 (2011), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p09.pdf (noting that






the violent criminals who are most likely to be serving the really
long sentences for which a second look would be most helpful.182
For example, roughly one in every ten state prison inmates is now
serving a life sentence,'83 and two-thirds of these were incarcerated
for homicide.1 84 Among those serving life, nearly a third of them
have no possibility of parole.'8 ' Additionally, the already
impressive fraction of prison lifers does not include those
sentenced to terms of years that approach or exceed normal
human life expectancies, 86 such as a thirty-year-old prisoner
sentenced to forty or more years in prison. Even among prisoners
not serving actual or effective life sentences, a great many are
serving ten, fifteen, or twenty-year sentences that will bar their
release until late middle age or beyond.1 87 Hence, to reintroduce
or reinvigorate second-look parole mechanisms for long-sentence
inmates in states that have abandoned or devalued such programs
is to offer relief primarily to murderers, rapists, robbers, violent
rowdies and chronic recidivists-with the concomitant risk that
they will abuse the opportunity and kill, rape, rob, or assault again.
That is a tough political sell.
Therefore, to broaden back-end release initiatives in the
states beyond drug defendants would require focusing public
attention, not on the crime the inmate committed, but on the age
of the offender and the length of time he must serve before
eligibility for consideration for discretionary release. Several
general considerations suggest themselves.
First, a politically saleable proposal might have to exclude
some types of criminal offenses. In particular, it might be very
182. Id. at 8.
183. See ASHLEY NELLIS & RYAN S. KING, No ExIT: THE EXPANDING USE OF LIFE
SENTENCES IN AMERICA 6 (2009), available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publ
ications/publications/incNoExitSept2009.pdf (reporting that in 2008, 140,610 people,
or 9.5% of all prisoners, were serving life terms).
184. Adam Liptak, To More Inmates, Life Term Means Dying Behind Bars, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 2, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/02/national/021ife.web.html?pagewante
d=all.
185. See NELLIS & KING, supra note 183, at 13 (reporting that in 2008, 29% of those
serving life terms were ineligible for parole).
186. Id. at 2.
187. Quick Facts About the Bureau ofPrisons, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, http://www.bop.
gov/news/quickjsp#3 (last visited Oct. 4, 2013) (estimating that nearly 40% of the federal
prison population was sentenced ten or more years, with 20.3% sentenced ten to fifteen
years, 9.3% sentenced fifteen to twenty years, and 9.9% sentenced more than twenty years
but not for life).
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difficult to sanction early release of homicide defendants, or at
least those who personally killed the victim and were found guilty
of entertaining a mental state other than negligence or
recklessness." Likewise, a good many sex crimes might have to be
excluded, however suitable such defendants might be on purely
objective grounds.1 89
Second, among the population of prisoners not excluded
by virtue of their offense of conviction, eligibility rules should be
crafted with a close eye on the actuarial realities of recidivism, or,
to speak more plainly, with the objective of releasing prisoners as
quickly as possible once they have reached their late forties or
early fifties and thus present a much-reduced risk to the public.
Third, principles of desert must be honored. Those
convicted of very serious crimes should be obliged to serve
significant terms, even if the offense occurred relatively late in life.
Fourth, a back-end discretionary release system,
particularly one operated by an executive branch administrative
body, must give reasonable deference to the legislative judgments
embodied in statutes governing initial sentence lengths and also to
the front-end sentencing authority of judges. For those serving the
long terms that are the primary focus of this section, this means
that they should get a second chance, but also that that chance will
commonly be deferred until society's legitimate demands are met.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article has surveyed the broad outlines of the
argument for a revived system of discretionary back-end release
from American prisons. I do not suggest that progress in this
direction is likely to be rapid or that balancing the sometimes
competing concerns raised by the issue will be simple, but I am
convinced that a thoughtful parole release revival is
desirable . . . and, for the first time in a long time, politically
plausible.
188. See NELLIS & KING, supra note 183, at 2.
189. See, e.g., CENTER FOR SEX OFFENDER MANAGEMENT, EXPLORING PUBLIC
AWARENESS AND ATTITUDES ABOUT SEX OFFENDER MANAGEMENT: FINDINGS FROM A
NATIONAL PUBLIC OPINION POLL 2 (2010), available at http://www.csom.org/pubs/CSOM
-Exploring%20Public%20Awareness.pdf (finding that public demands for stringent
sanctions and long prison terms are influenced by a mistaken perception of high
recidivism rates).
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